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Abstract
We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents
face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, ob-
serve private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social
Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details
of the given extensive form, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic
equilibriumbehavior. We establish general conditions for agreement, herding, and in-
formation aggregation in equilibrium, highlighting a connection between agreement
and information aggregation.
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1 Introduction
Social learning refers to the inference individuals draw from observing the behavior of
others, an inference which in turn impacts their own behavior. Social learning has served
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as an explanation for economic phenomena such as herding1, bubbles and crashes in
financial markets2 and technology adoption.3
Many theoretical models of rational social learning are based on a given dynamic so-
cial learning game, specified by a social learning setting and an extensive form. The setting
consists of the players, their actions and common utility function, the state and signal
spaces, and a commonly known joint probability distribution over the state and signals.
The extensive form specifies the decision times of players and what each player observes
at every given decision instant. These include sequential models, models of learning on
social networks4 and more.
This approach has two inherent weaknesses. First, the analysis of asymptotic equilib-
rium behavior in dynamic games is not straightforward5, resulting in a limited range of
tractable models and a focus on extremely stylized settings; in particular, the literature
has largely avoided studying models of repeated actions by rational non-myopic players.6
Second, when trying to understand or predict behavior in “real world” social learning set-
tings, the modeler might not know the exact nature of interaction among individuals, and
the sensitivity of the conclusions to each aspect of the extensive form is often unclear.
To address these issues we introduce a static equilibrium approach which we call social
learning equilibrium (SLE). We abstract away from the extensive form dynamics, and focus
directly on the asymptotic steady state to which the game converges. For a given social
learning setting, an SLE includes a description of the information available to each agent,
and an action chosen by each player, as a function of what she knows. An SLE does
not include any details of the extensive form. However, the information available to the
agents was presumably learned through participation in some extensive social learning
game. The equilibrium condition simply requires each agent’s action to be optimal, given
her information.
We consider large groups of agents and study three phenomena. Agreement occurs
when all agents choose the same action. Herding—a weaker form of agreement—occurs
when almost all agents choose the same action. Finally, information aggregation occurs
when all agents choose the optimal action, given the realized state.
1See Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani et al. (1992); Smith and Sørensen (2000).
2E.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Welch (1992); Chari and Kehoe (2003).
3E.g., Walden and Browne (2002); Duan et al. (2009).
4E.g., Parikh and Krasucki (1990); Gale and Kariv (2003); Rosenberg et al. (2009); Acemoglu et al. (2011);
Mossel et al. (2015); Mueller-Frank (2013); Lobel and Sadler (2015). Another early contribution, in a bound-
edly rational framework, is due to Bala and Goyal (1998).
5Gale and Kariv (2003): “The computational difficulty of solving the model is massive even in the case
of three persons [...] This is an important subject for future research.”
6Exceptions include Rosenberg et al. (2009) and Mossel et al. (2015).
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Our main results establish easily verifiable conditions on the setting and information
structure which guarantee either agreement, herding or information aggregation. As our
most important result, we point out a deep connection between herding and informa-
tion aggregation: when private signals are unbounded,7 herding can only occur when
large amounts of information are exchanged, and in particular enough information must
be exchanged for agents to learn the correct action. Perhaps surprisingly, this holds re-
gardless of the extensive form, generalizing a result of Smith and Sørensen (2000) for the
classical sequential model. The usefulness of all of our results lies in the fact that they are
proved in the static SLE setting, making them robust to the details of the extensive form,
and enabling the study of agreement, herding and information aggregation across a large
spectrum of models—and in particular models of repeated actions—that are intractable
to detailed dynamic analysis.
For most of our results we focus attention on the canonical setting of social learning
with countably many agents, binary states and actions, a common prior and conditionally
i.i.d. signals; this choice allows to more easily explain our ideas and techniques. We also
provide examples of how these can be applied beyond the canonical setting.
Amotivating example. To more concretely describe our approach and results we study
a particular social learning game, which a priori is not straightforward to analyze. We
explain how SLEs can be used to study this game, and what our results imply for it.
The setting of this game is the above mentioned canonical setting, with countably many
agents, binary actions and states, and stage utilities which equal 1 if the action matches
the state, and 0 otherwise.
The extensive form of this game is a variant of the classical sequential herding model,
but with a repeated action twist. Agents are exogenously ordered. Agent i chooses an
action in each of the time periods i, i +1, . . . , i +100, so that she lives for 101 time periods,
taking an action in each of these periods until her last action in period i+100, after which
she leaves the game. Actions are public information, so that each agent observes all the
actions taken by all the agents in all previous time periods, since period 1. Note that
agents receive no additional information beyond their private signals and others’ actions,
and in particular observe their stage utilities only after taking their last action. Agents
discount stage utilities by a common factor.
To the best of our knowledge this particular game has not been previously studied.
One obstacle to the analysis of this game is that in equilibrium, agents may not choose
7As defined by Smith and Sørensen (2000), private signals are unbounded if the support of the proba-
bility of either state conditional on one signal contains both zero and one.
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the myopically optimal action in each period, in an attempt to extract more information
from future observations of their peers’ actions.8 Indeed, it seems that one cannot hope
to obtain a complete, detailed description of any equilibrium of this game, even if one
considers myopic agents. Still, we now explain how our approach allows us to establish
herding and information aggregation results for this model.
Social learning equilibria. Instead of directly studying the dynamics of this game, we
study the steady state reached at time infinity. This will be captured by an SLE, and thus
will consist of a (random) action for each player, as well as the information available to
her.
Given a Nash equilibrium of the extensive form game, the associated SLE consists of
the last action of each player, and the information available to her at the end of the game.
That is, for player i it will include the action this player took at time i + 100, and the
information available to her when taking this action, which includes all the actions taken
by others up to and including time i + 99. Clearly, this action is a best response to this
information, and so the equilibrium condition of an SLE is satisfied.
More generally, we show in Theorem 5 that also in games where agents take infinitely
many actions—in fact, in a large class of such games—agents converge to an action (or
actions) that is optimal given the information they have at the limit. Thus, every social
learning game converges to an SLE.
Herding. A natural question is whether a herd arises in this game, as in the classical
sequential models. To study herding here, we will use only one additional feature of the
extensive form. Namely, that each agent i observes the actions of each agent j < i. Hence,
in the corresponding SLE, the information available to agent i includes the actions of
every agent j < i. We call such SLEs weakly ordered.
In Theorem 3 we show that every weakly ordered SLE satisfies herding: there is a (ran-
dom) action that is taken by all agents, except finitely many. This immediately implies
that in any equilibrium of the extensive form game described above, the last actions of all
(but finitely many) of the agents are the same.
Information aggregation. Our main result is Theorem 2. It establishes a fundamental
connection between herding and information aggregation.
Theorem 2 states that when private signals are unbounded, information aggregation
occurs in every SLE that exhibits herding: the herding action is optimal, given the state.
8Such equilibria have been constructed for other social learning games in Mossel et al. (2015).
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Thus, again, this applies to any equilibrium of the particular game described above.
More generally, Theorem 2 shows that—with unbounded signals and in large groups—
information aggregation is independent of the exact extensive form, and even indepen-
dent of the information agents have beyond their private signals: it holds whenever herd-
ing occurs. Hence, this result shows that in order for agents to herd—that is, to almost
all agree—they need to exchange a large amount of information, and in fact an amount
large enough for them to herd on the optimal action.
Social networks and herding in probability. One may be interested more generally in
SLEs that are not weakly ordered. In particular, a large literature studies models of social
learning on social networks, in which the observation structure is sparser. A variant of the
game described above is one in which agent i does not observe the actions of every agent
j < i, but just those of some subset; such models (without the repeated action aspect) have
been studied by Acemoglu et al. (2011) and others. As an example of another application
of our techniques, we consider the case that actions are eventually public: That is, the
actions of agent j are not observed by every i > j, but only by every i large enough. We call
such SLEs almost weakly ordered.
As we explain below, such SLEs no longer necessarily satisfy herding. We show in
Theorem 4 that they do, however, satisfy a weaker form of herding, which we call herding
in probability: there is a (random) action that is taken with arbitrarily high probability
by all the agents, except finitely many.9 In our main result, Theorem 2, it in fact suffices
to require herding in probability to induce information aggregation. Thus, also in this
variant of our game, when signals are unbounded then all agents converge to the optimal
action, with probability that tends to 1 as i tends to infinity.
Complete social learning equilibria. Weakening the assumption of weakly ordered
SLEs to almost weakly ordered SLEs resulted in the weaker result of herding in prob-
ability, rather than herding. It may also be interesting to strengthen the assumption, and
see if we can derive a stronger conclusion.
A complete social learning equilibrium (CSLE) is an SLE in which each agent’s informa-
tion includes the other agents’ actions. Such SLEs arise, for example, in the limit of social
learning games in which all agents act in all periods, and every agent observes the actions
of all others (e.g., Sebenius and Geanakoplos, 1983b). CSLEs are more generally related
to models in which others’ actions or beliefs are common knowledge, such as “Agreeing
9Formally, the agents actions converge in probability to some random herding action: for any ε > 0 there
are only finitely many agents i whose action is unequal to the herding action with a probability greater
than ε.
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to Disagree” (Aumann, 1976), the No Trade Theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), and
the common knowledge equilibria of DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998).
Clearly, every CSLE is weakly ordered, and hence satisfies herding. Theorem 1 shows
that, in a canonical setting, every CSLE in fact satisfies agreement, i.e., all agents select the
same action almost surely, rather than just all but a finite number. Previous work implies
that agreement must hold unless agents are indifferent.10 Our contribution is to show
that in large groups indifference is impossible, and so agreement always holds.
These results imply that in any game that converges to a CSLE, all agents converge to
the same action, and that when signals are unbounded they furthermore converge to the
optimal action. This implication does not require any analysis of the extensive form, but
merely that agents know which action their peers converge to. This includes countless
possible models, some of which may potentially be intractable to detailed analysis.
Information aggregation in social networks. We apply our SLE approach to the re-
peated action model analyzed by Mossel et al. (2015). In this social learning game all
agents act in all periods. Agents are connected by a social network and only observe the
actions of their neighbors.
We complement the results of Mossel et al. (2015), showing in Proposition 2 that
asymptotic agreement holds in every Nash equilibrium, for any strongly connected net-
work. It then immediately follows that the agreement action satisfies information aggre-
gation if private signals are unbounded (Corollary 1). In contrast, Mossel et al. (2015)
study how network structure affects information aggregation, and provide sufficient con-
ditions on the network that guarantee aggregation, regardless of whether signals are un-
bounded or not.
We also provide a new and simple proof of a result of Mossel et al. (2015), showing
that in symmetric networks the asymptotic agreement action satisfies information aggre-
gation, for any informative signal structure.
Concentration of Dependence. A driving force behind our results is what we call the
Concentration of Dependence Principle. Informally, this principle refers to the fact that
when an event E is a function of i.i.d. random variables, then E is approximately inde-
pendent of almost all the random variables (Lemma 1). Although we do not regard this
principle as a novel contribution to probability theory, we believe that the value of apply-
ing it to economics might go beyond social learning applications.
10The initial insight is due to Aumann (1976), with an important contribution by Milgrom and Stokey
(1982). Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983a) studied the question for finite action settings. In the setting of
social networks this was studied by Mueller-Frank (2013) and Rosenberg et al. (2009).
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In our social learning setting the Concentration of Dependence Principle implies that
social learning outcomes in large groups depend on the state, and beyond that only on
a small number of signals. We use this observation to prove almost all of our results:
to preclude indifference (and hence disagreement) in complete SLEs, to show that herds
arise in weakly ordered SLEs, and to show that herding implies information aggregation.
Extensions
We consider several extensions of our results and the model. We first allow for heteroge-
neous priors and utility functions across agents, and show that if there are finitely many
types, and if types are commonly known, then our results still apply.
We also analyze the case of bounded signals, where the support of the belief condi-
tional on one signal contains neither zero nor one. Here we borrow the concept of infor-
mation diffusion introduced by Lobel and Sadler (2015) in the context of the sequential
social learning model.11 We show that for bounded signals our theorems hold when one
replaces information aggregation with the weaker notion of information diffusion.
We next show that all our results carry forward to settings in which we relax the
assumption of conditional i.i.d. signals. Instead we assume that signals satisfy a mix-
ing property. Informally, this means that conditional on the state, each agent’s signal is
almost independent of almost all the other agents’ signals. Mixing signals capture set-
tings in which agents who are close to each other—either geographically or temporally—
observe the same or similar signals, but the signals of agents who are far away from each
other are nearly independent.
We also show that our results hold for large finite groups, with a probability that goes
to one as the group size goes to infinity. In particular, Proposition 6 provides an upper
bound for the probability of disagreement in CSLEs. This bound depends on the signal
structure and the size of the group, and tends to zero as the size of the group increases.
We next consider social learning games that contain both rational and boundedly ra-
tional agents. We emphasize that all our results on asymptotic equilibrium behavior of
the rational agents carry forward if the conditions on the subgraph of rational agents
coincide with the sufficient conditions of each theorem.
Finally, we extend our analysis beyond the canonical setting and consider the case of
arbitrary finite states and finite actions. As an example of how our results can be extended
in this direction, we provide a sufficient condition on the utility functions and the private
signals such that agreement holds in every CSLE.
11Assume that the support of private beliefs is [1− β,β]. An action satisfies information diffusion if it is
optimal given the state with a probability of at least 1− β.
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Related literature
The social learning literature is too large to comprehensively cite here.12 We limit the
discussion to those papers whose results are most closely related.
Our equilibrium approach is more in line with Aumann’s approach (1976) of study-
ing a static environment with common knowledge, as compared to later social learning
papers (e.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1982), which analyze the process by which
common knowledge is reached. Similarly to Aumann, we directly study the equilibrium,
rather than specifying the exact interaction structure and procedure by which the equi-
librium is obtained. Indeed, in many other fields of economics the tendency is to study
static equilibria directly rather than extensive forms. As we show in Theorem 5 there is
no loss in restricting attention to SLEs when analyzing asymptotic equilibrium behavior
of social learning games.
Our results for the canonical setting provide new insights to two classes of social
learning games that have been extensively analyzed in the literature; the repeated inter-
action model on social networks, and the canonical sequential social learning model. In
particular, our Proposition 2 complements the agreement results for settings of repeated
interaction of Gale and Kariv (2003), Mueller-Frank (2013), and of Rosenberg et al. (2009)
which all show that agreement occurs but in case of indifference among actions. Our
Corollary 1 extends the results of Mossel et al. (2015) in showing that information aggre-
gation holds for any strongly connected network if signals are unbounded. In sequential
settings, our work extends the classical herding and information aggregation results from
sequential models (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000)
to a large class of social learning games.
C¸elen and Kariv (2004) analyzed a variant of the canonical sequential social learning
game where each agent only observes his immediate predecessor. Acemoglu et al. (2011)
and Lobel and Sadler (2015) extended this approach by considering the case where each
agent observes a random subset of his predecessors.13 Our Theorem 3 is motivated by
their work, as it establishes a general sufficient condition on the observation structure
that induces herding in probability. Our Proposition 5 is closely related to Lobel and
Sadler (2015). For bounded signals, they introduce the notion of information diffusion,
which is a weakening of information aggregation. They provide two sufficient conditions
on the random observation structure such that information diffuses (respectively, fails
to diffuse) in any equilibrium. Applying our results to this concept, we shed additional
12For a recent survey see Golub and Sadler (2017).
13Acemoglu et al. (2011) assumes independent neighborhood draws across agents while Lobel and Sadler
(2015) allow for correlation.
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insight by connecting information diffusion to herding in probability.
The notion of an SLE is conceptually closely related to that of a correlated Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. CSLEs are related to rational expectations equilibria. Theorem 2 is simi-
lar to some results on optimality of rational expectations equilibria (Dutta and Morris,
1997; DeMarzo and Skiadas, 1998, 1999), which, unlike our results, already hold for a
small number of players; a likewise similar approach is taken by Ostrovsky (2012) in
studying information aggregation in dynamic markets, and by Babus and Kondor (2018)
who study trading in over-the-counter markets. We discuss these similarities and dif-
ferences more thoroughly in §2. Minehart and Scotchmer (1999) introduce a concept of
rational expectations equilibrium in a particular social learning setting. Despite some
superficial similarities, their approach is essentially different from ours. For example, an
equilibrium—as they define it—does not usually exist, and so they revert to an approxi-
mate equilibrium notion, in which they prove their main results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 introduces the model and our equi-
librium notion. §3 presents our results on agreement and information aggregation in
CSLEs. §4 establishes our results on herding and information diffusion in SLEs. §5 estab-
lishes the formal relation between social learning equilibria and asymptotic equilibrium
behavior in social learning games. §6 applies our results to models of social learning on
networks. §7 presents some extensions. §8 is a conclusion.
2 The Model
We consider a group of agents who must each choose an action under uncertainty about
a state of nature. Each agent’s utility depends only on her own action and the state, and
agents are homogeneous in the sense of sharing the same utility function. Each agent
observes a private signal, and additionally some information about the others’ signals. A
social learning equilibrium (SLE) includes a description of this additional information,
as well as a choice of action for each agent that maximizes her expected utility, given the
information available to her. We now define this formally.
Social learning settings
A social learning setting (N,A,Θ,u,S,µ) is defined by a set of players N , a compact metriz-
able action space A, a compact metrizable state space Θ, a continuous utility function
u : A ×Θ→ R, a measurable private signal space S, and finally a commonly known joint
probability distribution µ over Θ × SN .
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We will denote by θ the random state of nature and by s¯ = (si)i∈N the agents’ private
signals. When no ambiguity arises we will denote probabilities and expectations with
respect to µ by P[·] and E[·], respectively. For some modeling applications it will further-
more be useful to add to this probability space a non-atomic random variable r that is
independent of the rest.
Social Learning Equilibria (SLE). Each agent i, in addition to her private signal si ,
learns ℓi , which is some function of s¯ (and possibly r). Agent i’s (random) action is ai . It
takes values in A, and is some function of ℓi and si . Equivalently, ℓi and ai are random
variables that are, respectively, σ(s¯, r)- and σ(ℓi , si )-measurable.
Let ℓ¯ and a¯ denote (ℓi)i∈N and (ai)i∈N , respectively. In a given social learning setting,
a social learning equilibrium (or SLE) is a pair (ℓ¯, a¯) such that almost surely each agent’s
action ai is a best response, given her information ℓi and si :
ai ∈ argmax
a∈A
E [u(a,θ) | ℓi , si ] almost surely. (1)
It is useful to think of ℓi as the information that player i has learned through partici-
pation in the equilibrium of some extensive form game. Likewise, one should think of ai
as the action that player i converged to in the same game, so that the pair (ℓ¯, a¯) captures
the asymptotic state of the game in question. We elaborate on this in §5, where we show
that this asymptotic state indeed satisfies the SLE condition (1).
Note that since there are no externalities, and since the action and state spaces are
compact and utilities are continuous, an SLE exists for any setting, and moreover, that for
any ℓ¯ there exists an a¯ such that (ℓ¯, a¯) is an SLE.
So far we have put no restrictions on ℓ¯, and so, in this generality, one would not expect
to prove interesting results. In the subsequent sections we will see how some relatively
weak conditions on ℓ¯ yield interesting properties of a¯.
Complete Social Learning Equilibria (CSLE). The first class of social learning equi-
libria which we consider are complete social learning equilibria (or CSLE). In a CSLE each
ℓi includes a¯. That is, the information available to each agent includes the actions of
all other agents, and perhaps more information; formally, ai is σ(ℓj )-measurable for ev-
ery i, j ∈ N . We can therefore write ℓi = (ℓ0i , a¯) for some random variable ℓ0i , and so the
equilibrium condition becomes
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ai ∈ argmax
a∈A
E
[
u(a,θ) | ℓ0i , a¯, si
]
. (2)
Weakly ordered and almost weakly ordered SLEs In a CSLE it holds for any two agents
i and j that ai is σ(ℓj )-measurable: j observes the action of i. This is a very strong as-
sumption, which, as we show below, yields strong conclusions. We also study two weaker
assumptions.
We say that an SLE is weakly ordered if the set of agents can be identified with the
natural numbers in such a way that if i < j then agent j observes i’s action: ai is σ(ℓj )-
measurable.
An even weaker assumption is that of a almost weakly ordered SLE. An SLE is said to be
almost weakly ordered if, for each agent i there are only finitely many agents j such that
ai is not σ(ℓj )-measurable. We show that these weaker assumptions imply results which
are weaker, but nevertheless have profound implications.
Discussion of the equilibrium concept. SLEs can formally be thought of as a form
of correlated (Bayes-Nash) equilibria, in which each agent receives a signal ℓi and best
responds. Of course, since in the base game there are no externalities, this best response
is independent of the actions of others. As is usual in correlated equilibria, we think
of the signals ℓ¯ as being an endogenous part of the equilibrium (see, e.g., Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994, §3.3). Mathematically equivalently, one could interpret the additional
information ℓ¯ as being part of the environment, in which case the actions a¯ are simply
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, as in Bergemann and Morris (2016). We opt for the former
interpretation of endogenous ℓ¯, as it better captures the position of an analyst who might
not know ℓ¯ exactly. An additional motivation for this choice is our application of SLEs to
the study of the asymptotic state of an extensive form game. There, ℓi is the information
learned by i throughout the game, and in such games it is possible that agents’ strategies
affect what they learn.
CSLEs are related to rational expectations equilibria.14 Our work is most closely re-
lated to that of DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998), and in particular the CSLE equilibrium
condition (2) corresponds to condition (b) in their definition of a common knowledge
equilibrium. Their results are also related to ours: in their setting, information is al-
ways aggregated optimally, whenever posterior estimates (which correspond to actions
14Similar ideas are also used in some versions of self-confirming equilibria (Rubinstein and Wolinsky,
1994; Dekel et al., 1999, 2004). Ostrovsky (2012) also uses a similar approach.
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in CSLEs) are common knowledge. In our case this only holds for large groups and un-
bounded signals, as we show below.
3 Agreement and InformationAggregation inComplete So-
cial Learning Equilibria
In this section we study complete social learning equilibria (CSLEs). The CSLE assump-
tion is strong, and thus yields strong, crisp conclusions; this makes CSLEs a good starting
point for studying SLEs. In this section we also introduce the Concentration of Depen-
dence Principle.
We focus on a class of social learning settings which appears frequently in the litera-
ture: in canonical settings N is countably infinite, A = Θ = {0,1}, signals are informative
and conditionally i.i.d., and u(a,θ) = 1a=θ, so that the utility is 1 when the action matches
the state, and 0 otherwise.
Agreement. An SLE satisfies agreement if almost surely ai = aj for all pairs of agents i, j.
Our first result establishes agreement as a property of any CSLE.
Theorem 1. In a canonical setting every CSLE satisfies agreement.
This result shows that Aumann’s seminal agreement result carries over to canonical
social learning settings as a property of every CSLE. Previous results in the literature
have established that agreement is achieved, except in cases of indifference (Milgrom and
Stokey, 1982; Rosenberg et al., 2009; Mueller-Frank, 2013). Our contribution is to show
that, for the case of CSLEs in canonical settings, indifference almost surely does not occur
and hence agreement holds. This essentially follows from what we call the Concentration
of Dependence Principle, which we introduce now. This principle underlies almost all of
our results.
Concentration of Dependence. Informally, concentration of dependence refers to the
fact that when a decision or event is a function of i.i.d. signals then it significantly de-
pends on only very few of them. The underlying mathematical fact is a well known
phenomenon known as mixing, which we observe to have interesting implications in our
settings.
Formally, we say that a random variable X is ε-independent of an event E if for every
12
event F that depends only on X (i.e., if for every F ∈ σ(X)) it holds that
∣∣∣∣P[E ∩ F]−P[E] ·P[F]
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Note that X and E are independent if and only if this holds for every ε > 0.
Lemma 1 (Concentration of Dependence Principle). Let X1,X2, . . . be independent random
variables, and let E be any event defined on the same probability space. Then except for at most
1/ε2 many i’s, each Xi is ε-independent of E.
For the convenience of the reader we provide a proof of this fact in §A.15 In our canon-
ical setting the private signals are i.i.d., conditional on the state. It thus follows from this
principle that every event that depends on the private signals is approximately condi-
tionally independent of almost all of them.
Let us now briefly outline the proof of Theorem 1. First note that whenever both
actions are taken in equilibrium, it must be that all agents are indifferent between the
actions. This follows from the same intuition that underlies the no trade theorem of Mil-
grom and Stokey (1982), as well as similar results in social learning (e.g., Sebenius and
Geanakoplos, 1983a; Rosenberg et al., 2009; Mueller-Frank, 2013). This in turn implies
that the disagreeing actions are equal to the true state with probability 12 . Denote the dis-
agreement event byD and assume towards a contradiction that it has positive probability.
For agent i, let bi denote the optimal action of i conditional only on his private signal si .
Note that since signals are informative, bi is equal to the state of the world with a prob-
ability strictly larger than 12 . Consider a deviation strategy of each agent i such that she
selects the equilibrium action whenever D does not occur and bi otherwise; this clearly
cannot hurt the agent, since she is indifferent conditioned onD. The Concentration of De-
pendence Principle implies that D is ε-independent of si for all but finitely many agents
i. Hence for some agent i (in fact, all but finitely many) the probability of bi being equal
to the state conditional on D is strictly larger than 12 , establishing a contradiction.
Information Aggregation. We next turn to the learning properties of CSLEs. We have
shown above that the agents agree on the same (random) action. Under which conditions
is this agreement action optimal? That is, under which conditions is an SLE information
15Readers who are unfamiliar with this idea may wish to engage with some examples. E.g., let X1, . . . ,Xn
be i.i.d. fair coin tosses, and consider two possible events. The first is the event that the majority of Xi ’s
equal H . It is easy to calculate and see that all the Xi ’s are very weakly correlated with E, and indeed
intuitively this is clear. A less obvious example is when E is the event that an even number of Xi ’s are equal
to H . Here, changing any Xi (while keeping the rest fixed) alters the indicator function of this event, and
so it may seem that E strongly depends on each Xi . However, E is in fact independent of each Xi .
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aggregating? Note that in a canonical setting an SLE is information aggregating if almost
surely ai = θ for all i.
To motivate the discussion we consider an example of a CSLE that is not information
aggregating. In a canonical setting, assume that agents have a uniform prior, so that
P[θ = 1] = P[θ = 0] = 1/2, and that signals take values in {0,1} with P[si = θ | θ] = 6/10.
For i = 1, . . . ,5, let ℓi = (s1, . . . , s5). That is, the first five players all know each others’
private signals. Let b be the optimal action given knowledge of the first five agents’
signals:
b = argmax
a∈A
P[a = θ | s1, s2, s3, s4, s5] =

1 if
∑5
i=1 si ≥ 3
0 if
∑5
i=1 si ≤ 2.
For i > 5, let ℓi = b. That is, for i > 5, agent i’s additional information is the action b.
For each i, let ai be some action satisfying the SLE condition
ai ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[a = θ | ℓi , si ].
Thus (ℓ¯, a¯) is an SLE.
As a simple calculation shows, in this case it holds that ai = b for all i: every agent is
better off just following b than doing anything else. Thus, this SLE is in fact a CSLE, as
each agent knows b, and hence knows the actions of all other agents. Clearly, this CSLE
is not information aggregating, since the probability that b = θ is not one.16
The setting of this example is one with bounded signals; as defined by Smith and
Sørensen (2000), private signals are unbounded if the support of the private belief pi =
P[θ = 1 | si ] contains both 0 and 1. Similarly, private signals are bounded if the support
of private beliefs contains neither 0 nor 1. The example above shows that with bounded
signals a CSLE need not be information aggregating. The following result relates the
unbounded signal property to information aggregation in CSLEs.
Proposition 1. In a canonical setting with unbounded signals every CSLE is information ag-
gregating.
Combining Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 we learn that in the case of CSLEs agree-
ment implies information aggregation, if signals are unbounded. This relation between
agreement and information aggregation holds much more generally, as we will establish
in the next section. Indeed, Proposition 1 is a corollary of a stronger result, Theorem 2.
16In this same setting there exist other CSLEs that are information aggregating: for example, simply let
all agents learn all the others’ private signals. Then ai = θ for all i, almost surely.
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Nevertheless, we now sketch a proof of this Proposition, as it is simpler than that of The-
orem 2.
The proof of Proposition 1 is also driven by the Concentration of Dependence Prin-
ciple. By Theorem 1, there is some (random) agreement action a0 that all players take.
Consider (towards a contradiction) the case in which the probability that a0 = θ is not 1,
but some q < 1. A player i can consider the deviation in which, instead of always choosing
a0, she chooses a0 when her private signal is weak, but follows her private signal when-
ever her private belief pi is strong. By strong we mean either greater than q (in which
case she would take action 1) or less than 1 − q (in which case she would take action 0).
Because signals are unbounded, this occurs with positive probability.
By the Concentration of Dependence Principle, a0 is essentially a function of some
finite number of private signals, and almost all players i have a private signal that is
almost independent of the agreement action a0. Therefore this deviation is profitable for
some (in fact, almost all) players. Thus it is impossible that in equilibrium q < 1, and so
in equilibrium a0 = θ almost surely.
4 Herding and Information Aggregation
Arguably, the most prominent result in the social learning literature is the herding re-
sult established by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) in the canonical sequential social learning
model. They show that if agents make an irreversible binary decision in strict sequential
order, observing all the actions taken before them, then eventually all agents take the
same action. In other words, herding occurs: with probability one, all but a finite set of
agents select the same action. The herding action is not necessarily optimal, even though
the information contained in the pooled private signals suffices to choose the optimal ac-
tion. Smith and Sørensen (2000) consider the canonical sequential social learning model
and show that when signals are unbounded herding still occurs, but the action chosen by
the herd is optimal.
We analyze two different herding properties of SLEs.17 We say that an SLE satisfies
herding if there is almost surely a cofinite set of agents who choose the same action. This
(random) action is denoted as the herding action. Equivalently, for any ordering of the
agents, the sequence of random variables (ai)i converges almost surely to the herding
17The following definitions and equivalences apply for settings with a finite action set A.
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action a∗:
P[ lim
i→∞
ai = a
∗] = 1.
We say that an SLE satisfies herding in probability if there is a (random) herding action
that the agents’ actions converge to in probability. Formally, an SLE satisfies herding in
probability if there is a random variable a∗ such that for any ε > 0 there are only finitely
many agents i such that P[ai , a
∗] > ε. Equivalently, for any ordering of the agents,
lim
i→∞
P[ai = a
∗] = 1.
We would like to emphasize that despite the image that the term “herd” evokes, herd-
ing does not imply that the agents take a suboptimal action; indeed, the action chosen by
the herd can be correct with probability one (Smith and Sørensen, 2000). Accordingly,
we think of herding as a weaker form of agreement: an SLE satisfies agreement when all
agents agree. A herding SLE is one in which almost all the agents agree. Herding in prob-
ability holds when there is an action that only finitely many agents are significantly likely
to disagree with. Note that agreement implies herding, which in turn implies herding in
probability.
The subsequent analysis focuses on the relation between herding and information
aggregation. Consider a SLE that satisfies either herding or herding in probability. We
say that the herding action satisfies information aggregation if it is almost surely optimal,
conditioned on the state. In the canonical setting this means that the herding action is
equal to θ with probability one.
Herding and information aggregation. Our first result of this section highlights a deep
connection between herding and information aggregation: when signals are unbounded,
one cannot herd without aggregating information. In other words, in order for agents to
herd they must exchange a large amount of information, and in particular an amount so
large that they learn the state in the process.
Theorem2. In a canonical setting, and when signals are unbounded, in every SLE that satisfies
herding in probability, the herding action satisfies information aggregation.
The proof of this theorem again relies on the Concentration of Dependence Principle,
and is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. The herding action is approximately indepen-
dent of almost all the private signals. Yet, it is taken by almost all the agents. Therefore,
there will be an agent who takes the herding action with very high probability, and whose
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signal is almost completely independent from it. Hence such an agent would prefer to
follow her own private signal whenever doing so is more likely to be correct than follow-
ing the herd. But in equilibrium this agent does follow the herd, and so it must be that her
private signals never give an indication that is stronger than the information contained
in the herding action. But this is impossible when signals are unbounded.
This result is related to similar results for rational expectations equilibria (e.g., Dutta
and Morris, 1997; DeMarzo and Skiadas, 1998, 1999; Ostrovsky, 2012). There, however,
agreement implies efficient aggregation of information even for a small number of play-
ers and bounded signals, whereas in our setting this holds less generally and crucially
depends on both the large size of the group and the unboundedness of the signals.
ASufficient Condition for Herding. As we note above, herding is a weak form of agree-
ment. Above we have shown that CSLEs satisfy agreement: if all agents observe each
others’ actions then they all agree. In this section we relax the complete observation as-
sumption of CSLEs to a weaker condition, and show that it implies herding rather than
agreement.
Recall that an SLE is weakly ordered if the set of agents can be identified with the
natural numbers in such a way that if i < j then agent j observes i’s action: ai is σ(ℓj )-
measurable.
The classical sequential models of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Smith and Sørensen
(2000) are a particular example in which the set of agents is identified with the natu-
ral numbers and where each agent learns only the actions of her predecessors. Weakly
ordered SLEs are a larger class that allows agents to furthermore have additional in-
formation, beyond the actions of their predecessors. They can thus be used to model
the asymptotic state of games with richer extensive forms: perhaps the agents come in
groups that act together; perhaps they exchange information with the people standing
behind them or in front of them in line; or maybe they act more than once, as in the
motivating example in the introduction of this paper.
We show that every weakly ordered SLE satisfies herding
Theorem 3. In a canonical setting every weakly ordered SLE satisfies herding.
The proof of Theorem 3 uses similar ideas to that of Theorem 1, but involves a number
of additional steps. Here, one must first observe that if both actions are taken infinitely
often then agents must asymptotically be indifferent. If this occurs with positive proba-
bility, then eventually agents will be able to guess (correctly with high probability) that
this will happen. Since—again asymptotically—almost all agents have signals that are
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independent of this event, they would choose to ignore it and follow their own private
signals. But then they would not be indifferent, and thus this cannot happen with positive
probability.
A Sufficient Condition for Herding in Probability. Consider an SLE where the ℓi ’s fea-
ture a layered observation structure: Assign each agent to one layer (L1,L2, . . .), with each
layer having a finite number of agents. Assume that each agent observes, in addition to
her private signal, the actions of all the agents in all the previous layers. Assume also
private signals are unbounded (see, e.g., Rosenberg and Vieille, 2017).
Fixing the sizes of layers L1, . . . ,Ln−1, there is, conditioned on the state, some non-
zero probability that any agent in layer Ln will choose action 0, and some (other) non-
zero probability that she will choose 1. Since the actions of the players in a given layer
are i.i.d. conditioned on the state and the previous players’ actions, it follows from the
Law of Large Numbers that if we choose each layer to be large enough, then with large
probability there will, in every layer, be agents who choose both actions. Thus this SLE
does not exhibit herding. However, we show that it does exhibit herding in probability.
More generally, we show that herding in probability is obtained whenever each agent’s
action is “eventually public”; that is, when each agent is observed by all except a finite
group.
This is an example of an almost weakly ordered SLE. Recall that an SLE (ℓ¯, a¯) is almost
weakly ordered if for each agent i there are only finitely many other agents j such that ai
is not σ(ℓj )-measurable. That is, the set of agents who observe agent i’s action is cofinite.
A natural example for an almost weakly ordered observation structure is the canonical
sequential social learning model with the additional assumption that agents might not
observe the actions of others who decided within a certain time interval before. However,
if a given predecessor acted sufficiently earlier then her action is observed. One particular
instance of this class is the abovementioned example of agents who are arranged in layers,
and the agents of each layer observe the actions of all the agents in the previous layers.
More generally, one could have a complicated social network structure in the spirit of
Acemoglu et al. (2011).
Theorem 4. In a canonical setting, every almost weakly ordered SLE satisfies herding in prob-
ability.
It follows from this theorem and from Theorem 2 that when signals are unbounded
then almost weakly ordered SLEs satisfy information aggregation. This constitutes a
strengthening of the learning theorem of Smith and Sørensen (2000) to a much larger
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class of extensive forms, and in particular to models of partial observations structures in
the spirit of Acemoglu et al. (2011).
5 Social Learning Equilibria and Social Learning Games
In this section we consider a large class of social learning games. A social learning game
is a dynamic game with incomplete information in which agents choose actions and ob-
serve information about other agents’ actions and signals. Its definition includes a social
learning setting—as in the definition of an SLE—and a description of the extensive form.
This class comprises many models studied in the literature, including sequential learning
models, models of repeated interaction on social networks, and the game described in the
introduction of this paper.
The main result of this section relates social learning games to SLEs. We show that the
asymptotic equilibrium behavior of agents in any social learning game is captured by an
SLE: for any distribution over asymptotic equilibrium action profiles of a social learning
game there exists an SLE with a matching distribution over action profiles.
This correspondence provides motivation for studying SLEs, and also allows to under-
stand the long-run behavior of agents in many dynamic settings, by applying our results
to the corresponding SLEs.
Social learning games
A social learning game includes a social learning setting (N,A,Θ,u,S,µ), together with a
description of the extensive form by which agents interact and learn. The extensive form
consists of the tuple (T ,k,δ). For each agent i the set Ti ⊆ {1,2, . . .} denotes the set of action
times of agent i, i.e., the set of time periods in which agent i exogenously “wakes up”,
receives information, and takes an action. The set T = (Ti)i∈N denotes the tuple of action
times. For each agent i and time t ∈ Ti , let ki,t be the information learned by agent i at
time t, and let ai,t be the action taken by agent i at time t. We denote by
k
t
i = {ki,τ : τ ≤ t,τ ∈ Ti}
the information observed by agent i by time t, and by
ki = {ki,t : t ∈ Ti}
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all the information observed by her, excluding her signal. We denote by
hti = {ai,τ : τ < t,τ ∈ Ti}
the actions taken by agent i before time t, and by
ht = (hti )i∈N
all the actions taken by all the agents before time t.
The information ki,t is some function of the agents’ actions before time t, the private
signals themselves, as well as the additional independent random variable r, and takes
values in some measurable space:
ki,t = ki,t(h
t , s¯, r).
The (possible) dependence on r allows this framework to include mixed strategies and
random observation sets, such as observing a random subset of the previously chosen
actions.
The strategy of agent i at time t ∈ Ti is denoted by σi,t , takes values in A, and is some
function of the information known to agent i at time t, which consists of kti and her private
signal si :
σi,t = σi,t(k
t
i , si ).
The collection of maps σi = (σi,t)t∈Ti is player i’s strategy, and the tuple of strategies across
all agents, (σi )i∈N , is the strategy profile. The history
(
ht
)
t∈N is generated according to
(σi )i∈N .
Finally, δ is the common discount factor, and agent i’s discounted expected utility is
∑
t∈Ti
δt ·Eσ [u(ai,t ,θ)].
A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if for each agent i her strategy σi maximizes her
discounted expected utility given σ−i , among all possible strategies for player i.
If agents are myopic, i.e. δ = 0, a strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if for each
agent i, given σ−i , in each period t her strategy σi,t is such that her action ai,t maximizes
her expected utility in period t ∈ Ti conditional on kti and si .
This definition of a social learning game is rather general and captures a variety of
different models. Most prominently it captures the sequential social learning model of
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Bikhchandani et al. (1992). To see this simply set Ti = {i} for every agent i and
ki,i = ki = {aj,j : j < i}.
The sequential social learning models of Acemoglu et al. (2011), Lobel and Sadler
(2015) and others are likewise included in this framework. Here we have Ti = {i} again,
but ki,t does not include all the actions of the predecessors, but rather only those of a
random subset of the predecessors. Themodels of repeated interaction on social networks
of Gale and Kariv (2003), Mossel et al. (2014) and Mossel et al. (2015) can be captured
by setting Ti = N for all agents i and letting ki,t contain the last period actions of all
the neighbors of agent i. Rosenberg et al. (2009) study a more general model that is not
subsumed by this framework, but still shares many similarities. In fact, the proof of our
result for this section, Theorem 5, exactly follows the proof of their Proposition 2.1.
Finally, the models of repeated communication of beliefs in a social network ana-
lyzed in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and Parikh and Krasucki (1990) can be
captured by a squared loss utility function and a discount factor equal to zero, hence
inducing myopic behavior.
For a given strategy (σi,t)t∈Ti , let A¯i denote the (random) set of accumulation points of
agent i’s realized actions; if Ti is finite, then let A¯i be the singleton that contains only the
last period action of agent i. If Ti is infinite and A finite, then A¯i consists of the actions
chosen infinitely often.
Given these definitions, we are ready to establish the relation between Nash equilibria
of social learning game and SLEs. As we mention above, this theorem is essentially due
to Rosenberg et al. (2009).
Theorem 5. Consider a social learning game, i.e., a social learning setting and extensive form
(T ,k,δ), and a corresponding Nash equilibrium σ. Let a¯ be any (random) action such that
ai ∈ A¯i , and let ℓi = ki , where ki is generated according to σ. Then (ℓ¯, a¯) is an SLE.
This theorem states that the asymptotic state of every Nash equilibrium18 is captured
by an SLE.19 The information ℓi of agent i is generated along the sequence of equilibrium
actions in the social learning game, and thus ℓi depends on the interaction environment
18For this general class of social learning games there are a few possible definitions of a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (see e.g., Watson, 2017), under all of which PBEs are Nash equilibria. Thus Theorem 5 applies
to all PBEs.
19The converse of Theorem 5 is also (trivially) true: given any SLE (ℓ¯, a¯), we can define the game in which
Ti = {1} for all i and ki,1 = ℓi for each each i. Then there is an equilibrium in which every agent i takes
action ai at time 1, and thus, under this equilibrium, this game (immediately) converges to the SLE (ℓ¯, a¯).
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described by the extensive form. Importantly, ℓi depends also on the equilibrium strate-
gies, since the information content of an agent’s action depends on her strategy.
Theorem 5 essentially shows that the asymptotic equilibrium properties of any social
learning game can be analyzed via our SLE concept. Thus, while the definition of SLE is
very permissive, its predictive power unfolds when applied to social learning games.
In light of the definition of SLEs, Theorem 5 equivalently states that in any social
learning game, every limit action of every agent i is optimal conditional on her limit
information ki . This follows from Proposition 2.1 in Rosenberg et al. (2009). In the case
that agent i only acts finitely many times, it is immediate that her limit action—which,
in this case, is by definition equivalent to her last action—is optimal conditioned on her
information, and thus the SLE condition is satisfied.
The proof for agents that act infinitely often requires more work. The essential idea
is that since beliefs converge, eventually each agent knows that her belief is unlikely to
change substantially. Hence her incentive to deviate from the myopic expected utility
maximizing action decreases.20 We provide a version of the proof by Rosenberg et al.
(2009) adjusted to our language and notation in the appendix, establishing a link between
their result and our concept of SLE.
Learning and agreeing in social learning games
In Theorem 5 we showed that the asymptotic outcomes of social learning games corre-
spond to SLEs. That is, if for each agent i we let ℓi denote the information i has learned by
participating in the game, and if we let ai be the action that it converged to (or some limit
action in lieu of convergence), then (ℓ¯, a¯) is an SLE. We can therefore apply our results on
SLEs to social learning games, with far-reaching implications.
Consider any social learning game in a canonical setting in which each agent observes
the limit action of all other agents; they could, additionally, exchange information in
other ways. Therefore, by Theorem 5, the limit behavior of any Nash equilibrium of
this game is captured by a CSLE. This implies, for example, that the repeated interaction
model of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) can be solved via CSLEs. It follows from
Theorem 1 that in the canonical setting all agents must always converge to the same ac-
tion. And if private signals are unbounded, then by Proposition 1 they must all converge
to the correct action.
A straightforward application of Theorem 2 to social learning games implies that in
every social learning game in a canonical setting with unbounded signals, herding in
20This argument implies that although we have assumed a common discount factor for all agents, Theo-
rem 5 still holds when discount factors differ across agents.
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probability implies that the herding action equals the realized state.
Theorem 3 implies that herding is indeed the outcome across a large spectrum of so-
cial learning games: it suffices that if i < j then j observes which actions i converges to.
This generalizes the results of Bikhchandani et al. (1992), highlighting the deeper forces
that drive them: herding (e.g., in the classical sequential model) is not a feature of the se-
quential timing of actions, but rather of the observation structure of agents. In particular,
any social learning game with a weakly ordered observation structure satisfies herding as
an asymptotic equilibrium outcome; one such example is the game we introduce in the
introduction of this paper. Relatedly, Theorem 4 shows that herding in probability holds
in any social learning game where the limit action of every agent i is observed by a cofinite
set of agents.
6 Social Learning in Networks
In this section we use SLEs and the Concentration of Dependence Principle to strengthen
existing results on social learning in networks. More precisely, we apply our concepts to
the social learning game analyzed by Mossel et al. (2015). Denote the network neighbors
of agent i by Ni and assume that the network is strongly connected: for each pair of agents
i and j there is a finite tuple of agents (k1,k2, . . . ,kn) such that k1 = i, kn = j, and km+1 is a
neighbor of km for m = 1, . . . ,n − 1. Each set of neighbors Ni is assumed to be finite.
In the notation of §5, their game can be described as follows: the setting is a canonical
setting; the action times Ti are the entire set N for every agent i; and the information
observed by agent i at time t is the actions of her neighbors in the previous time period:
ki,t = (aj,t−1)j∈Ni .
Finally, utilities are discounted at a common rate. So agents observe their private sig-
nals in the beginning, at each period they take an action which yields stage utility 1 if it
matches the (binary) state and 0 otherwise, and after taking this action they observe their
neighbors’ actions. Note that stage utilities are not observed, so that the initial private
signals comprise all the available information.
As in Mossel et al. (2015) we assume that P[θ = 1] = 1/2, and that the private be-
liefs P[θ = 1 | si] have a non-atomic distribution. Note that this in particular means that
signals are informative. As Mossel et al. (2015) show this implies that the sets A¯i of accu-
mulation points of the realized actions are almost surely the same for all agents. Namely,
in every Nash equilibrium of this game there exists a (random) A¯ such that P[A¯i = A¯] = 1,
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for every agent i, so that when A¯ = {a} then eventually each agent takes the action a, and
when A¯ = {0,1} then all agents choose both actions infinitely many times.
Using our Concentration of Dependence Principle in an argument identical to the one
used in the proof of Theorem 1, it is possible to strengthen this result and show that
A¯ , {0,1}. That is, the asymptotic indifference case cannot occur and hence all agents
converge to the same (random) action a∗.
Proposition 2. Asymptotic agreement holds in every Nash equilibrium. That is, there is a
(random) action a∗ such that
P[A¯i = {a∗}] = 1
for every agent i.
It follows from this proposition that for every Nash equilibrium of this game there
is a unique SLE (ℓ¯, a¯) that is the limiting state of this game, in the sense of Theorem 5:
ℓi = ki and ai ∈ A¯i = {a∗}. Moreover, in this SLE we have agreement, since ai = a∗. Hence
Theorem 5, Theorem 2 and Proposition 2 jointly imply the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If signals are unbounded then in every Nash equilibrium the asymptotic agree-
ment action satisfies information aggregation.
That is, the asymptotic agreement action a∗ is equal to θ almost surely. Different
from Corollary 1, Mossel et al. (2015) focus on the properties of the network structure
that assure information aggregation for all informative signal structures, rather than just
unbounded ones. They sketch a proof of why this holds for symmetric equilibria on sym-
metric networks (e.g., the infinite two dimensional grid), and prove that, more generally,
information is aggregated whenever no agent in the network is much more important
than others.21
The formal proof of this result in Mossel et al. (2015) is rather involved and combi-
natorial. We provide here a short formal proof for the case of symmetric networks. We
focus on the case that the network is simply the infinite chain, although the same proof
applies more generally to symmetric networks.22 Importantly, in this setting informa-
tion aggregation is attained even when signals are bounded. We include the proof here,
21More specifically, they show that information aggregation holds if there are numbers d and L such that
no agent has observes more than d others, and whenever and i observes j , there is a path from j back to i
of length at most L.
22By symmetric we mean that all agents play the same role in the geometry of the network. In the
mathematics literature graphs with this property are called vertex transitive. Examples include infinite
grids and infinite regular trees. See, e.g., Mossel et al. (2015) for a formal definition.
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as it provides a short and illustrative example of an application of the Concentration of
Dependence Principle.
For this proof we will need the additional assumption that each agent’s strategy is
some function of the entire vector of private signals, and does not depend on additional
randomness. For pure equilibria this follows immediately from the definitions. In mixed
equilibria this assumption is without loss of generality, since one can consider a model
with equivalent outcomes in which we add to each signal an additional random compo-
nent that is independent of the state, and which the agent can use to randomize, rather
than using our global randomness r.
Proposition 3. Assume the network is the infinite chain: agents are identified with the integers,
and i and j are neighbors iff |i − j | = 1. Then in any symmetric equilibrium the asymptotic
agreement action a∗ satisfies information aggregation.
Proof. Condition on θ. By the Concentration of Dependence Principle, all but finitely
many private signals si are ε-independent of a
∗. By the symmetry assumption, if some si
is ε-independent of a∗ then the same holds for all. Hence all si ’s are ε-independent of a∗.
Since this holds for every ε > 0, it follows that a∗ is independent of each si . By the same
argument, a∗ is independent of the random variable s[i,i+n] = (si , si+1, . . . , si+n) for any agent
i ∈Z and n ≥ 0.
Note that a∗ is some function of the private signals, since it is the limit of any agent’s
actions, and each of these is some function of the private signals. Thus a∗ is simultane-
ously a function of the private signals and is conditionally independent of any finite set
of them. Since signals are conditionally i.i.d., a∗ must depend on the tail of the sequence
of private signals, and so must be constant, conditioned on the state. There are therefore
four possibilities: either (1) a∗ = 0, or (2) a∗ = 1, or (3) a∗ = 1−θ or (4) a∗ = θ. Since in the
first three cases the agents’ utilities are at most 1/2, these cannot be equilibria, as agents
could profitably deviate by following their own private signals. Hence it must be that
a∗ = θ. 
As Mossel et al. (2015) argue, an interpretation of this theorem is that egalitarian-
ism leads to efficient aggregation of information. This is a message that has emerged, in
various forms, in a number of other diverse settings (e.g., Kalai, 2004; Acemoglu et al.,
2010; Golub and Jackson, 2010; Dasaratha and He, 2017).23 The intuition behind this
result again stems immediately from the Concentration of Dependence Principle, which,
23In other settings, Dasaratha et al. (2018) reach an opposing conclusion: diversity helps aggregation,
while egalitarianism hurts it.
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combined with symmetry, starkly implies that actions are conditionally independent of
private signals.
7 Extensions
7.1 Heterogeneous preferences and priors
We relax the homogeneity assumption and consider agents who have different utility
functions and/or prior beliefs (with full support). Assume that all agents share the same
belief regarding the conditional signal distributions but there are finitely many different
types. Agent i’s type is determined by her full-support prior belief on the binary state
space and her utility function for a binary action. We assume that for each utility function
it is strictly preferable to match the action with the state than to mismatch.
Assume that the agents’ types are common knowledge. The following can be estab-
lished by making slight adjustments to our proofs.
Proposition 4. In a canonical setting with finitely many commonly known types and where
signals are unbounded, every CSLE satisfies information aggregation.
If signals are unbounded then in a CSLE all agents agree on the same action, and
additionally this action is optimal. Thus unbounded signals overcome heterogeneity in
priors and payoffs. The result follows from the fact that types are commonly known and
there exists at least one type with infinitely many agents. Proposition 4 is interesting
to view in light of Aumann’s “agreeing to disagree” result (1976). He showed that if
agents share a common prior then common knowledge of posteriors implies agreement.
Proposition 4 shows that if signals are unbounded then (common) knowledge of actions
implies that agreement and information aggregation hold among an infinite group of
agents, even if priors and utility functions differ.
7.2 Mixing signals and canonical* settings
All of our results hold when we relax the requirement that signals are conditionally i.i.d.,
and instead require only a form of mixing.
We say that a sequence X1,X2, . . . of random variables is mixing if (1) the marginal
distributions of the Xi are all identical, and (2) for each ε > 0 there is an n(ε) such that for
each agent i there are at most n(ε) agents j such that Xi and Xj are not ε-independent. We
say that private signals are mixing when they are mixing random variables, conditional
on the state.
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Intuitively, private signals are mixing when for each agent i there are only finitely
many other agents with whom i has a significantly correlated signal. One obvious exam-
ple of mixing signals are i.i.d. signals. Other examples arise naturally when agents who
are close to each other—either geographically or temporally—observe the same or similar
signals, but agents who are far away from each other observe only very weakly related
signals.
The following lemma captures the Concentration of Dependence Principle for mixing
random variables.
Lemma 2 (Concentration of Dependence for Mixing Random Variables). Let X1,X2, . . . be
mixing random variables, and let E be any event defined on the same probability space. Then for
every ε > 0 then is anm(ε) such that, except for at mostm(ε)many i’s, each Xi is ε-independent
of E.
In canonical* settingsN is countably infinite, A =Θ = {0,1}, the utility function assigns
1 if the action of an agentmatches the state and 0 otherwise, and signals are informative—
as in canonical settings. However, in canonical* settings signals are not required to be
i.i.d., but are merely required to be mixing. As mentioned above, all of our results hold
when we relax the requirement that signals are i.i.d., and require only mixing; in the
Appendix we prove our theorems in this generality.
7.3 Bounded signals
Recall that Proposition 1 shows that in a canonical setting with unbounded signals every
CSLE is information aggregating.
What can be said about information aggregation when signals are bounded? Since
independent of the signal structure there always exists an information aggregating equi-
librium,24 the question is what is the worst possible equilibrium outcome in terms of
learning. To answer this, we borrow the notion of information diffusion introduced by
Lobel and Sadler (2015) in context of the sequential social learning model. Consider the
support of the private belief and let its convex hull be [βL,βH ]. For simplicity assume that
the support is symmetric, i.e., βL = βH = β.
A herding SLE in a canonical setting satisfies information diffusion if the probability
of the herding action a∗ being equal to the realized state θ is at least 1 − β. As Lobel and
Sadler highlight, the notion of information diffusion is particularly insightful if strong
signals, i.e., those that induce a posterior belief close to β or 1− β, are rare.
The next result is a generalization of Theorem 2 to the bounded signal setting.
24To see this, consider the SLE where each agent’s information includes the private signals of all others.
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Proposition 5. In a canonical* setting every SLE that satisfies herding in probability also
satisfies information diffusion.
7.4 Large finite groups
All of our theorems are proved in settings with infinitely many agents. Analogous quali-
fied statements for large finite groups follow from our proofs.
For example, Theorem 1 states that in a canonical setting, every CSLE satisfies agree-
ment, so that
P[ai = aj for all i, j] = 1.
The following result is the analogous statement for agreement in CSLEs with finite
groups of agents.
Proposition 6. Consider a setting that is canonical, except that the group of agents is finite
of size n. Then there is some constant C > 0 that depends only on the distribution of private
signals such that in every CSLE,
P[ai = aj for all i, j] ≥ 1−
C√
n
.
Proposition 6 shows that for a fixed private signal distribution, the probability of dis-
agreement is at most of order 1/
√
n, uniformly among all CSLEs with n agents. The
constant C, which is calculated explicitly in the proof, decreases as signals get more in-
formative.
7.5 Social LearningGameswithRational andBoundedly Rational Agents
Earlier work in the literature on repeated interaction in social networks considered the
case of social networks where rational and boundedly rational agents coexist. Mueller-
Frank (2014) shows that all agents asymptotically aggregate information if the set of ac-
tions is rich. Chandrasekhar et al. (2018) show that in the case of binary actions informa-
tion aggregation can fail for certain network structures.
It is easily verified that all asymptotic properties we establish via the SLE approach
carry forward for the subset of Bayesian agents in the network, if the conditions we lay out in
the theorems are satisfied for the Bayesian agents; the boundedly rational agents simply
provide additional information to the rational ones, and this additional information can
be embedded in ℓi . Whether the results carry forward to the asymptotic behavior of the
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boundedly rational agents depends on their updating heuristic, and is beyond the scope
of this paper.
7.6 Beyond the Canonical Setting: Many States and Actions
Another extension of our results beyond the canonical setting is to settings with more
than two states and more than two actions. In this section we consider social learning set-
tings in which signals are still conditionally independent—as in the canonical setting—
but the set of states can be of any (finite) size, as can the set of actions. We show that our
agreement result for CSLEs still holds, under an additional condition on the structure
of the utility function and the private signals; this condition rules out some pathological
cases in which disagreement can arise.25
We consider a social learning setting (N,A,Θ,u,S,µ) with N countably infinite, A and
Θ finite, and conditionally independent private signals; we will refer to this as a finite
setting. We say that private signals are always useful if, for any prior p ∈ ∆(Θ) for which
more than one action maximizes expected utility, observing a conditionally independent
private signal (distributed as the agents’ signals si ) strictly increases the expected utility
of a rational agent.26 That is, if sx is an additional conditionally independent private
signal, distributed as si , and if D is any event that is conditionally independent of sx, then
whenever ∣∣∣∣∣∣argmaxa∈A E[u(a,θ) |D]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
(that is, whenever conditioning on D results in more than one optimal action) it holds
that
E[max
a∈A
E[u(a,θ) | D,sx] |D] >max
a∈A
E[u(a,θ) |D]
(that is, learning sx increases one’s expected utility). It is easy to see that for the case of
two states and two actions, this holds whenever signals are informative.
The assumption of always useful signals implies that it is impossible for a state θ0
to have more than one optimal action, since otherwise, conditioning on the event that
the state is θ0, an additional private signal will not change the agent’s belief and thus
cannot result in higher expected utility. Another implication for the case of many states
25Clearly, there can be disagreement in equilibrium when signals are completely uninformative. Like-
wise, when two actions yield the same utility in some state then agents who learn the state can choose
different actions in equilibrium. These issues are avoided in the canonical settings, where each state has a
different uniquely optimal action and where signals are informative. In this more general setting a more
complicated assumption is required.
26Arieli and Mueller-Frank (2017) show that in a general sequential social learning game, in every equi-
librium signals are never useful at the limit belief.
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is that signals cannot be restricted to some particular dimension and ignore others. For
example, ifΘ = {0,1}×{0,1}, the assumption of always useful signals rules out a signal that
is informative with respect to the first coordinate, but provides no information regarding
the second. Note that the assumption of always useful signals does not imply that signals
are unbounded.
Proposition 7. Consider a finite setting with infinitely many agents. If signals are always
useful then every CSLE satisfies agreement.
The proof is provided in Appendix H. The information aggregation results of Propo-
sition 1 and Theorem 2 also hold in this setting, under an appropriate definition of un-
bounded signals. In interest of brevity we leave Proposition 7 as the only result that we
extend in this direction.
8 Conclusion
We introduce social learning equilibria as a useful tool to analyze social learning. The ad-
vantage over the conventional approach is that results can be derived and predictions can
be made without knowing the exact dynamic of the interaction structure. This facilitates
the analysis of models that are otherwise seemingly intractable.
We provide agreement, herding and information aggregation results of social learning
equilibria that unify and shed additional insight on the social learning literature. In
particular, we show that the relation between unbounded signals and the optimality of
the herding action established by Smith and Sørensen (2000) holds much more generally.
In fact, in any canonical social learning environment with unbounded signals the action
selected in a Bayesian herd is optimal.
There are several natural avenues for future research. The Concentration of Depen-
dence Principle naturally lends itself to proving positive results: namely, that agreement,
various forms of herding, and information aggregation occur when the agents observe
enough of their peers’ actions. These conditions on the observation structure are in gen-
eral not necessary: indeed, in many cases it may be that a detailed analysis of the dynam-
ics of an extensive form game can yield stronger conclusions than one can hope to deduce
using the SLE approach.27 We leave the pursuit of negative results and the associated
necessary conditions to future work.
The second avenue of future work concerns a detailed study of more general social
learning settings. While we gave some examples of how our results extend beyond the
27One such example is the main result of Mossel et al. (2015); we elaborate on this in §6.
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canonical setting, we chose to focus on this setting as it allowed us to more easily explain
the main principles at work.
Third, and related to the previous avenue, is a detailed and general study of the im-
plication of rational and boundedly rational agents interacting in a social learning envi-
ronment.
The fourth avenue of future research concerns the extension of our analysis to capture
payoff externalities. So far, the social learning literature focused almost exclusively on the
case of pure informational externalities but for some notable exceptions in very specific
environments.28 SLEs may prove to be a useful tool to answer these questions, which we
leave for future work.
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A Concentration of Dependence
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2. Choose any ε > 0 and let Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xik be k random variables
that are not ε-independent of E. Without loss of generality wemay assume that (i1, i2, . . . , ik) =
(1, . . . ,k). Let F1, . . . ,Fk be events that witness the violation of ε-independence, so that for
i = 1, . . . ,k
∣∣∣∣P[E ∩ Fi]−P[E] ·P[Fi ]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε, (3)
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and each Fi is in σ(Xi ).
Let Y be the indicator of the event E. Then we can write (3) as
∣∣∣∣Cov(Fi ,Y )
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε.
Let ηi ∈ {−1,+1} equal the sign of Cov(Fi ,Y ). Then (3) is equivalent to
Cov(ηiFi ,Y ) ≥ ε.
Summing over i we get
k∑
i=1
Cov(ηiFi ,Y ) ≥ kε.
By additivity of covariance, it follows that
Cov

k∑
i=1
ηiFi ,Y
 ≥ kε.
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality it follows that
√√
Var

k∑
i=1
ηiFi
 ·Var(Y ) ≥ kε.
Denote I =
∑k
i=1ηiFi , and note that Var(Y ) ≤ 1, since Y ∈ {0,1}. So, squaring both sides
yields
Var(I ) ≥ k2ε2. (4)
Consider first the i.i.d. case. Then Var(I ) is at most k, since I is the variance of k
independent random variables, each with variance at most 1. Hence we have that
k ≥ k2ε2
or k ≤ 1/ε2. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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Consider now the mixing case. Write
Var(I ) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
Cov(ηiFi ,ηjFj)
Now, by the mixing property, for each i there are at most n(ε) possible j’s such that
Cov(ηiFi ,ηjFj ) > ε
2/2, in which case it is at most 1. Hence
Var(I ) ≤ k(n · 1+ (k − n) · ε2/2) ≤ kn+ k2ε2/2.
Applying this back into (4) yields
kn+ k2ε2/ ≥ k2ε2.
Rearranging yields
k ≤ 2nε2,
and so we can have proved Lemma 2, with m(ε) = 2n(ε)/ε2. 
B Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We start with the following lemma, which is essen-
tially a formulation of the No Trade Theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982). This lemma
states that when there is disagreement then players must be indifferent.
Let (ℓ¯, a¯) be a CSLE in a setting in which Θ = {0,1}. Denote agent i’s equilibrium belief
by
qi = P[θ = 1 | ℓi , si ],
and let the disagreement event D be the event that ai , aj for some i, j ∈N .
Lemma 3. Let A =Θ = {0,1} and u(a,θ) = 1a=θ (as in a canonical setting, but with no restric-
tions on the signals). In any CSLE, if the disagreement event D has positive probability, then
conditioned on D it almost surely holds that qi = 1/2 for all i.
Proof. Consider an outside observer who observes all the agents’ actions a¯. Her belief is
q∗ = P[θ = 1 | a¯].
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Since a¯ is σ(ℓi , si )-measurable, it follows from the law of total expectations that for every
i
q∗ = E[qi | a¯]. (5)
Since 1 is the action that is optimal for beliefs above 1/2, we have that ai = 1 implies that
qi ≥ 1/2. Likewise, ai = 0 implies qi ≤ 1/2. Hence the claim follows by (5). 
To prove Theorem 1 we show that the probability of the disagreement event D is zero.
As we show, this follows from the Concentration of Dependence Principle.
The proof of this theorem will follow a strategy that we will use again for other results
of this paper. We will consider, for each agent i, a deviation in which she plays a different
action bi whenever she observes that the event D occured, and otherwise plays ai .
To define the action bi that she takes when she observesD, we consider (as an auxiliary
construction) an additional fictitious player x who observes whether or not D occurred
(i.e., observes the random variable 1{D}, the indicator of D), and additionally receives
a signal sx, which, conditioned on θ, is independent of the other agents’ signals, and
distributed identically to theirs. Denote by bx an action chosen by such a player, which is
optimal conditioned on D:
bx = b(sx) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[a = θ |D,sx]. (6)
The event D depends on the (real) agents’ actions, and so is conditionally independent of
sx. Note that we are not formally changing our model by adding agent x, but only using
it as a way to define the function b above.
Consider now a possible deviation by agent i who chooses the action
bi = b(si ) (7)
whenever she observes D. Here b is the function defined in (6). Intuitively, agent i, by
choosing bi when D occurs, is choosing an action that would be optimal if D were condi-
tionally independent of her signal. In the following lemma we show that the probability
that bi is the correct action tends to the probability that bx is the correct action. This
follows from Concentration of Dependence. We state and prove this lemma in more gen-
erality than we need for this theorem, because we use it in other proofs.
Lemma 4. Let (ℓ¯, a¯) be an SLE in a canonical* setting, and let F be any event that is σ(a¯)-
37
measurable. Let
cx = c(sx) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[a = θ | F,sx],
and let ci = c(si). Then
lim
i→∞
P[ci = θ,F] = P[cx = θ,F].
That is, for high i, under the event F, the probability that the action ci is correct tends
to that of cx, which—crucially—is conditionally independent of F.
Proof of Lemma 4. By the Concentration of Dependence Principle, for every ε > 0 it holds
for all i large enough that both θ = 0 and θ = 1
∣∣∣P[ci = θ,F | θ]−P[ci = θ | θ] ·P[F | θ]∣∣∣ < ε,
and so
lim
i→∞
P[ci = θ,F | θ] = P[ci = θ | θ] ·P[F | θ],
where the right-hand side does not depend on i, since the ci ’s are identically distributed.
Since cx is also identically distributed it follows that
lim
i→∞
P[ci = θ,F | θ] = P[cx = θ | θ] ·P[F | θ] = P[cx = θ,F | θ],
where the second equality holds since cx and F are conditionally independent. Multiply-
ing both sides by P[θ] and summing over θ = 0 and θ = 1 yields that also unconditionally
lim
i→∞
P[ci = θ,F] = P[cx = θ,F].

Given Lemma 4 we are ready to prove our Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1 and Proposition 6. To prove our claim we need to show that the proba-
bility of the disagreement event D is zero.
Assume towards a contradiction that D has positive probability. We consider, for each
player i, the deviation of following her private signal whenever D occurs, in which case
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she chooses action bi as in (7). When the complement of D occurs, she does not deviate,
choosing ai .
The profit player i stands to gain from this deviation is
P = P[bi = θ,D]−P[ai = θ,D].
The second term is equal to
P[ai = θ |D] ·P[D] =
1
2
P[D]
since, by Lemma 3, conditioned on D player i is indifferent, and so her expected utility
from any action is 1/2.
Consider first the case that there are infinitely many agents (Theorem 1). By Lemma 4,
the first term tends to
P[bx = θ,D] = P[bx = θ |D] ·P[D].
Now, since signals are informative, and since conditioned on D the probability of each
state is 1/2, P[bx = θ | D] > 1/2. Hence P is positive for all i large enough, and we have
reached a contradiction with our equilibrium assumption. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
Consider now the case that there are n <∞ agents (Proposition 6). Denote
Q = P[bx = θ].
Since bx is conditionally independent of D, it follows that
Q = P[bx = θ |D],
and so Q is simply the expected utility of agent x, conditioned on the disagreement event
D, under which x has posterior 1/2. Therefore, since private signals are informative,
Q > 1/2, and furthermore Q depends on the private signal distributions, but not on the
SLE: it is simply the expected utility of an agent whose prior makes her indifferent and
who acts after observing a signal.
Let ε = 1/
√
n/2− 1. By the Concentration of Dependence Principle there are at least
n − 1/ε2 = n/2 + 1 agents i such that bi is ε-independent of D, conditioned on θ = 1,
and likewise for θ = 0. Hence there is at least one agent i such that bi is 1/
√
n/2− 1-
independent ofD conditioned on both θ = 1 and θ = 0. Therefore, by the same calculation
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as in Lemma 4, it will hold for this agent that
∣∣∣P[bi = θ,D]−P[bi = θ] ·P[D]∣∣∣ < 1√
n/2− 1 .
Since P[bi = θ] = P[bx = θ], it follows that
P[bi = θ,D] ≥Q ·P[D]−
1√
n/2− 1 .
By the equilibrium assumption
P[ai = θ,D] ≥ P[bi = θ,D],
and so, since P[ai = θ,D] =
1
2P[D], we have that
1
2
P[D] ≥Q ·P[D]− 1√
n/2− 1 .
Rearranging yields
1
Q − 1/2
1√
n/2− 1 ≥ P[D].
This completes the proof of Proposition 6, for C = 12(Q−1/2) . 
C Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we prove Proposition 5, which is a generalization of Theorem 2; Propo-
sition 5 applies more generally to canonical* settings, and to signals that can be either
bounded or unbounded. Since information diffusion coincides with information aggre-
gation when signals are unbounded, Theorem 2 follows immediately.
Let (ℓ¯, a¯) be an SLE that satisfies herding in probability. Let a∗ be the herding action,
and let
p = P[a∗ = θ]
be the probability that the herding action is optimal. We need to show that p = 1.
Let the convex hull of the support of private beliefs be [β,1 − β] (so that β = 0 when
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signals are unbounded), and assume by contradiction that
p ≤ 1− β − 2ε
for some ε > 0. Hence, either for θ = 0 or for θ = 1 it holds that P[a∗ = θ | θ] ≤ 1− β − 2ε.
Assume without loss of generality that this holds for θ = 1, so that
p1 = P1[a
∗ = θ] ≤ 1− β − 2ε,
where here, and in the remainder of this proof, we simplify notation by writing P1[·] to
denote P[· | θ = 1].
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, let
bi = b(si) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[θ = a | si]
be an optimal action chosen given agent i’s private signal only. Let Bi be the event that
P[bi = θ | si] > 1− β − ε. Since the bi ’s are identically distributed, all of the events Bi have
the same probability. Furthermore, this probability is positive, by our assumption on the
support of the private signals.
Imagine that agent i deviates and chooses bi whenever Bi occurs, and otherwise fol-
lows ai . Then her expected gain in utility is
P[bi = θ,Bi ]−P[ai = θ,Bi ].
We prove the claim by showing that this gain is strictly positive, which contradicts the
equilibrium assumption. In fact, we show that this already holds conditioned on θ = 1
(with the case θ = 0 following from the same argument). Recall that to simply notation
we write P1[·] to denote P[· | θ = 1].
To bound the first term, we note that, by the definition of Bi ,
P1[bi = θ,Bi ] ≥ (1− β − ε)P1[Bi ].
To bound the second term, we write
P1[ai = θ,Bi ] = P1[ai = θ,ai = a
∗,Bi ] +P1[ai = θ,ai , a∗,Bi ]
= P1[a
∗ = θ,ai = a∗,Bi ] +P1[ai = θ,ai , a∗,Bi ]
Since a¯ satisfies herding in probability, limiP[ai = a
∗] = 1, in the limit the second term
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vanishes and it follows that
limsup
i
P1[ai = θ,Bi ] = limsup
i
P1[a
∗ = θ,Bi ].
It follows from the Concentration of Dependence Principle that
limsup
i
P1[a
∗ = θ,Bi ] = P1[a∗ = θ] ·P1[Bi ] = p1 ·P1[Bi ],
where the right-hand side does not depend on i, since the events Bi all have the same
probability. We have thus shown that
limsup
i
P1[ai = θ,Bi ] = p1 ·P1[Bi ],
Combining the bounds on the two terms we get that the expected gain in utility con-
ditioned on θ = 1 is
liminf
i
P1[bi = θ,Bi ]−P1[ai = θ,Bi ] ≥ (1− β − ε − p1)P1[Bi ].
Since we assumed that p1 ≤ 1−β−2ε we have that this is at least εP1[Bi ], and in particular
positive. This completes the proof of Proposition ??.
D Proof of Theorem 3
In this section we prove Theorem 3, in the more general framework of canonical* settings
(see §7.2).
Since the SLE is weakly ordered, we can identify the agents with the set of natural
numbers {1,2, . . .} in such a way that if i > j then i knows j’s action. Let
xi = P[θ = 1 | a1, . . . ,ai ]
be the sequence of public beliefs, and let
qi = P[θ = 1 | ℓi , si ]
be agent i’s equilibrium belief. Note that, since each agent i knows {a1, . . . ,ai},
xi = E [qi | a1, . . . ,ai ] , (8)
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by the law of total expectations.
Note also that the action 1 is optimal for beliefs 1/2 and higher, and the action 0 is
optimal for beliefs 1/2 and lower. Therefore, and since a¯ is an equilibrium,
ai = 1⇒ qi ≥ 1/2 and ai = 0⇒ qi ≤ 1/2 (9)
and
E[u(ai ,θ) | qi ] = P[ai = θ | qi ] = max{qi ,1− qi}. (10)
We start with two simple claims regarding ai and xi .
Claim 1. If ai = 1 then xi ≥ 1/2. If ai = 0 then xi ≤ 1/2.
Proof. By (9) we have that qi ≥ 1/2 conditioned on ai = 1. Hence, by (8), xi ≥ 1/2 condi-
tioned on ai = 1. An analogous argument holds for the case ai = 0. 
Claim 2. P[ai = θ | xi] = max{xi ,1− xi}.
Proof. By Claim 1
P[θ = ai | xi] =

P[θ = 1 | xi] if xi > 1/2
P[θ = 0 | xi] if xi < 1/2
P[θ = ai | xi ] if xi = 1/2.
By (8) and (9), if xi = 1/2 then xi = qi . Therefore, and since P[θ = 1 | xi] = xi , and P[ai =
θ | qi = 1/2] = 1/2 by (10),
P[θ = ai | xi] =

xi if xi > 1/2
1− xi if xi < 1/2
1/2 if xi = 1/2.
Thus P[θ = ai | xi] = max{xi ,1− xi}. 
Let
x = P[θ = 1 | a¯],
and note that xi is a bounded martingale that converges a.s. to x. It thus follows from
Claim 1 that conditioned on ai taking both values infinitely often it holds that x = 1/2.
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Thus, to prove our theorem, we will show that the probability of x = 1/2 is zero. Accord-
ingly, define the event
F0 = {x = 1/2},
and for ε > 0 define the events
Fεi = {xi ∈ (1/2− ε,1/2+ ε)}.
The event Fεi is the event that the public belief xi is close to 1/2. Since the sequence (xi)i
converges a.s. to x, we have that
lim
i→∞
P[F0 \ F iε] = 0 (11)
for every ε > 0, and that
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[Fεi ] ≥P[F0]. (12)
Thus, to prove thatP[F0] = 0—which, as we explained above, proves the claim—it suffices
to show that the left hand side of (12) vanishes.
To this end, as in the proof of Theorem 1, let
bx = b(sx) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[θ = a | F0, sx]
be an optimal action given an additional agent x’s private signal only, conditioned on F0.
Let bi = b(si ). Note that
P[bi = θ] = P[bx = θ] = P[bx = θ | F0] >
1
2
,
where the first equality follows from the fact that bi and bx are conditionally identically
distributed, and the second from the fact that bx is conditionally independent of F
0. The
inequality follows because private signals are informative.
Consider the deviation in which player i chooses bi instead of ai , whenever F
ε
i occurs;
this is possible, since Fεi is σ(ℓi , si )-measurable. Then player i’s gain in expected utility
from this deviation is
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ]−P[ai = θ,Fεi ].
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We prove that the left-hand side of (12) vanishes by showing that if it does not then
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ]−P[ai = θ,Fεi ] > 0,
and thus this is a profitable deviation for some ε small enough and i large enough, con-
tradicting the assumption that a¯ is an SLE.
To this end, we note that
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ] ≥P[bi = θ,F0]−P[bi = θ,F0 \ Fεi ],
since
F0 \ (F0 \ Fεi ) = F0∩ Fεi ⊆ Fεi .
It thus follows by (11) that
liminf
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ] ≥ liminf
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
0].
By the Concentration of Dependence Principle, as used in Lemma 4,
lim
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
0] = P[bi = θ] ·P[F0].
Since private signals are informative, P[bi = θ] > 1/2, and so we have that
liminf
ε→0
liminf
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ] >
1
2
P[F0]. (13)
Now,
P[ai = θ | Fεi ] = E
[
P[ai = θ | xi] | Fεi
]
= E
[
max{xi ,1− xi} | Fεi
]
,
where the second equality is an application of Claim 2. Since xi ∈ (1/2− ε,1/2 + ε) condi-
tioned on Fεi , we get that
P[ai = θ,F
ε
i ] <
(
1
2
+ ε
)
·P[Fεi ].
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Therefore, by (12),
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[ai = θ,F
ε
i ] ≤
1
2
·P[F0].
Therefore, in combination with (13), the expected profit from deviating from ai to bi
on Fεi satisfies
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ]−P[ai = θ,Fεi ] > 0,
and thus this is a profitable deviation for some ε small enough and i large enough. Hence
it follows that F0 has probability zero, concluding the proof of Theorem 3.
E Proof of Theorem 4
Identify the set of agents with the natural numbers {1,2, . . .}. Since there are only finite
many actions (in fact, two), by compactness there is some subset (ik)k of the agents whose
actions converge in probability to some random action a∗:
lim
k→∞
P[aik = a
∗] = 1. (14)
Assume towards a contradiction that there is another subset (jk)k that converges to a
different action. That is, assume that there is some random b∗ such that P[a∗ , b∗] > 0 and
lim
k→∞
P[ajk = b
∗] = 1. (15)
It follows from (14) and (15) that
lim
k→∞
P[aik = θ] = P[a
∗ = θ] and lim
k→∞
P[ajk = θ] = P[b
∗ = θ]. (16)
By the equilibrium property, if agent i observes j’s action (i.e., if aj is σ(ℓi , si )-measurable),
then
P[ai = θ] ≥P[aj = θ].
Since the SLE is almost weakly ordered, we have that for a fixed j this indeed holds for
all i large enough, and so, taking the limit along the sequence (ik)k yields by (16) that
P[a∗ = θ] ≥ P[aj = θ].
46
Taking now the limit along (jk)k and applying (16) again yields
P[a∗ = θ] ≥ P[b∗ = θ].
By symmetry, we have that, in fact, this holds with equality.
Now,
P[a∗ = θ] = P[a∗ = θ,a∗ = b∗] +P[a∗ = θ,a∗ , b∗]
= P[a∗ = θ,b∗ = θ,a∗ = b∗] +P[a∗ = θ,a∗ , b∗],
and likewise
P[b∗ = θ] = P[a∗ = θ,b∗ = θ,a∗ = b∗] +P[b∗ = θ,a∗ , b∗].
Since P[b∗ = θ] = P[a∗ = θ], subtracting these equations yields
P[a∗ = θ,a∗ , b∗] = P[b∗ = θ,a∗ , b∗].
Hence it must be that
P[b∗ = θ | a∗ , b∗] = P[a∗ = θ | a∗ , b∗] = 1
2
. (17)
Hence by Bayes’ Law
P[θ = 1 | a∗ , b∗] = 1
2
. (18)
Let F be the event a∗ , b∗. As in the proof of Theorem 1, choose
bx = b(sx) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[θ = a | si ,F],
and bi = b(si). As in the proof of Theorem 3, we note that P[bi = θ] > 1/2, since signals
are informative.
Let Fi be the event that conditioned on i’s information, the probability that a
∗
, b∗ is
at least 1/2:
Fi = {P[a∗ , b∗ | ℓi , si ] ≥ 1/2}.
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Since the SLE is almost weakly ordered, it follows that
lim
i→∞
P[Fi△F] = 0, (19)
That is, the probability that F occurs but Fi does not—or vice versa—is very small for
large i; for large i, agent i approximately knows if a∗ , b∗. This is implied by almost
weak ordering (and the Martingale Convergence Theorem), which implies that for each j
it holds for all i large enough that agent i knows (a1, . . . ,aj ).
Consider the strategy in which agent i chooses bi whenever Fi occurs, and otherwise
plays ai . Then her expected gain from this deviation is
Pi = P[bi = θ,Fi]−P[ai = θ,Fi ]
since on the event Fci her utility is the same as when she does not deviate (as on this event
she indeed plays ai and does not deviate).
Recalling that F is the event that a∗ , b∗, it follows from (17) and (19) that
limsup
i→∞
Pi = limsup
i→∞
P[bi = θ,Fi ]−P[ai = θ,Fi]
= limsup
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F]−P[ai = θ,F]
= limsup
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F]−
1
2
P[F].
By the Concentration of Dependence Principle, as applied in Lemma 4,
lim
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F] = P[bi = θ] ·P[F].
Hence
lim
i→∞
Pi = P[F] ·
(
P[bi = θ]−
1
2
)
.
Since signals are informative this is positive, and so we have reached a contradiction. This
completes the proof of Theorem 4.
F Proof of Theorem 5
This proof is essentially a recasting of the proof of Proposition 2.1 in Rosenberg et al.
(2009) to our language and notation.
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Fix an agent i. The case that δ = 0 or Ti is finite is immediate. We thus assume
henceforth that δ > 0 and |Ti | =∞.
Let
vi =max
a∈A
E[u(a,θ) | ki , si ]
be the maximum expected utility agent i can guarantee given what she (asymptotically)
knows at the end of the game.
Fix (ki , si ) and ε > 0, and let Aε,Aε ⊆ A be the sets of actions given by
Aε =
{
a ∈ A : E[u(a,θ) | ki , si ] > vi − ε
}
and
Aε =
{
b ∈ A : E[u(b,θ) | ki , si ] < vi − 3ε
}
.
That is, Aε is the set of actions that is ε-optimal, and Aε is the set of actions that is 3ε-
suboptimal—conditioned on the information available to the player at the end of the
game.
For t ∈ Ti let
Uε,t = inf
a∈Aε
E[u(a,θ) | ki,t , si ]
be the worst expected utility (given the information available to i at time t) of any a ∈ Aε.
Note that Uε,t is a bounded supermartingale, and likewise
Uε,t = sup
b∈Aε
E[u(b,θ) | ki,t , si ],
is a bounded submartingale, and hence both converge. Furthermore,
lim
t∈Ti
Uε,t ≥ vi − ε and lim
t∈Ti
Uε,t ≤ vi − 3ε.
That is, for large enough t, agent i will assign high expected utility to all actions in Aε,
and low expected utility to all actions in Aε. In particular, it will almost surely hold for
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all t ∈ Ti large enough that
inf
a∈Aε
E[u(a,θ) | ki,t , si ] > sup
b∈Aε
E[u(b,θ) | ki,t , si ] + ε,
so that for all t large enough agent i will have a larger expected utility for any a ∈ Aε,
as compared to any b ∈ Aε. Hence agent i will eventually only choose actions in Acε, the
complement of Aε. Therefore, and since A
c
ε is compact, any limit point of the sequence of
actions of i must be in Acε. Since this holds for all ε > 0, we have shown that every limit
point of the actions of i must be in ∩ε>0Acε, which is equal to the set of actions that yields
an expected utility vi , conditioned on (ki , si ). This concludes the proof.
G Proof of Proposition 2
Let D be the event that A¯i = {0,1} for all i. That is, D is the event that every agent chooses
both actions infinitely often. By (Mossel et al., 2015, Theorem 5.1), D is equivalent to the
event that A¯i = {0,1} for some agent i; that is, if A¯i = {0,1} for some i then the same holds
for all. Hence the event D is σ(ki , si )-measurable for every player i, since at the end of the
game each player knows if she took both actions infinitely often or not.
Let (ℓ¯, a¯) be given by ℓi = ki and let ai be equal to some (measurable) choice from A¯i .
Then (ℓ¯i , a¯) is an SLE, by Theorem 5. Also, D is σ(ℓi , si )-measurable. Since conditioned on
D the probability that θ = 1 is 1/2, we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1. Assume
by contradiction that D has positive probability, and consider the deviation in which,
whenever D occurs, agent i, instead of choosing ai , chooses bi = b(si), where b satisfies
b(sx) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[θ = a |D,sx].
The same argument of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that this is a profitable deviation,
thus showing that the assumption thatD has positive probability leads to a contradiction.
H Proof of Proposition 7
In this section we prove Proposition 7. The proof starts with the following “No Trade”
Lemma, showing that disagreement implies indifference. Its proof, which we omit, fol-
lows the same argument as the proof of Lemma 3.
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Lemma 5. Fix a social learning setting with A and Θ finite, and let (ℓ¯, a¯) be an SLE defined
on this setting. Let A0 be a subset of A, and let D be the event that for each a ∈ A0 there is an
agent who chooses the action a:
D = {for each a ∈ A0 there exists an i ∈N such that ai = a}.
If the probability of D is positive, then for any a,b ∈ A0 it holds that
E[u(a,θ) |D] = E[u(b,θ) |D].
Given this lemma, we turn to the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let A0 be a subset of A of size at least 2, and let D be the disagree-
ment event that for each a ∈ A0 there is an agent who chooses the action a:
D = {for each a ∈ A0 there exists an i ∈N such that ai = a}.
We assume by contradiction that D has positive probability. By Lemma 5,
E[u(a,θ) |D] = E[u(b,θ) |D]
for all a,b ∈ A0, and we denote this quantity by U (A0 | D). Using this notation, we can
write the expected utility of agent i as
E[u(ai ,θ)1{D}] +E[u(ai ,θ)(1−1{D})] =U (A0 |D) ·P[D] +E[u(ai ,θ)(1−1{D})] (20)
As in the proof of Theorem 1, let
bx = b(sx) ∈ argmax
a∈A0
E[u(a,θ) |D,sx],
denote bi = b(si), and consider a deviation by agent i in which she chooses bi whenever D
occurs, and ai otherwise. Then the expected utility of this deviation is
E[u(bi ,θ)1{D}] +E[u(ai ,θ)(1−1{D})]. (21)
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Now,
E[u(bi ,θ)1{D}] =
∑
ω∈Θ
E[u(bi ,θ)1{D} | θ =ω] ·P[θ =ω]
=
∑
ω∈Θ
E[u(bi ,ω)1{D} | θ = ω] ·P[θ = ω]
=
∑
ω∈Θ
∑
a∈A
u(a,ω)P[bi = a,D | θ = ω] ·P[θ = ω]. (22)
By the Concentration of Dependence Principle
lim
i→∞
P[bi = a,D | θ =ω] = P[bi = a | θ = ω] ·P[D | θ =ω].
Note that the right hand side holds for any i, since signals are conditionally identically
distributed. Hence it also holds for agent x, and thus
lim
i→∞
P[bi = a,D | θ =ω] = P[bx = a | θ =ω] ·P[D | θ =ω].
Substituting this back into (22) yields
lim
i→∞
E[u(bi ,θ)1{D}] =
∑
ω∈Θ
∑
a∈A
u(a,ω)P[bx = a | θ =ω] ·P[D | θ =ω] ·P[θ =ω]
=
∑
ω∈Θ
∑
a∈A
u(a,ω)P[bx = a,D | θ = ω] ·P[θ = ω]
= E[u(bx,θ) | D] ·P[D].
By our assumption that the signals are always useful,
E[u(bx,θ) |D] > U (A0 |D).
Substituting this back into (21) and comparing to (20) shows that bi is a profitable devia-
tion for some i large enough, and so we have reached a contradiction with our equilibrium
assumption. 
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